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This chapter gives an impression of the development of the relatively young AI and 
computer science fields in Europe and China and how the current situation has 
developed over the past 20 years, where European and Chinese researchers are equal 
colleagues on an international stage and where diplomatic relations between the USA 
and China on the international stage have consequences felt directly by European AI 
researchers in their labs. 
In what ways are AI researchers in China and Europe competitors with each other, for 
example in terms of the global shortage of trained AI researchers and practitioners? 
At the same time, the AI research community collaborates globally, so how can we 
ensure that the field continues to benefit from open international collaboration? 
 
Chinese AI and Computer Science Research becomes Internationally 
Competitive 
 
The author of this chapter has more than 35 years’ experience working as a computer 
scientist at the forefront of technology innovation and research, of which more than 
25 years have been at the Dutch National Research Center for Mathematics and 
Computer Science (CWI). She has been actively engaged in reflecting on the field of 
computer science in her roles within Informatics Europe, an association of European 
computer science departments, of which she was the president 2016-2017. Since the 
beginning of 2018 she has been the European director of a joint research lab: the 
Sino-European Laboratory of Informatics, Automation and Applied Mathematics 
(LIAMA). LIAMA was founded in 1997 by the French National Institute for 
Research in Digital Science and Technology (INRIA) and the Institute of Automation 
of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CASIA).  
 
Initially, the LIAMA collaboration could be described as stimulating Chinese 
colleagues to publish in international venues. This situation drastically changed over 
the last 20 years, and today it is hard to imagine the relatively insignificant role that 
China played at the end of the 20th Century in Artificial Intelligence (AI) and 
Computer Science research when LIAMA was founded. Computer Science is a 
relatively young discipline; as an object of study, it only came into being around the 
1950’s, with the Second World War giving a huge impetus to the building of 
computers and the development of programming independently of the hardware. The 
field was heavily influenced – dominated even – by the USA, where an ecosystem of 
academic and commercial research contributed to the globally successful Silicon 
Valley. International giants such as Amazon, Facebook, Google, and Microsoft are 
now household names across the globe. 
 
English was, and still is, the lingua franca of computing. The most prestigious 
journals and conferences, in which AI and computer science researchers across the 
globe publish, are in English. 
 
LIAMA was established at the time when there was little interaction between the 
Chinese computer science community and the international (English-speaking) 
community. Where there was interaction, typically, Chinese students would go to the 
USA, study, and often remain for longer periods to become successful internationally 
recognised researchers (see Introductory chapter). Research funds were relatively 
plentiful in the USA – partially because of the investment by large corporations; such 
as Apple, Google/Alphabet, IBM, and Microsoft; in in-house research labs; and the 
academic ecosystem – for example through internships and faculty grants. 
 
INRIA, while situated in France, offers an attractive environment to international PhD 
students because of its open research culture and the use of English. A Chinese PhD 
student, Songde Ma, obtained his PhD while working at INRIA in the mid-1980’s 
(1983-1986). During his time there, he was inspired by the excellence of the research 
culture at the institute. After his return to China he became the Director General of 
CASIA, and initiated the creation of LIAMA between CASIA and INRIA1. INRIA, 
aware of its international role of stimulating excellent research, welcomed the 
opportunity to encourage collaboration between its researchers and the then relatively 












In 2008, the 17th International World Wide Web Conference was held in Beijing2 – a 
few months before the Olympic Games. The stadium was almost finished – located a 
few hundred metres from the conference venue. The research presented at the 
conference was of the same high quality expected of an international computer 
science conference. Of the 89 full papers published in the main conference, 15 had at 
least one author from a Chinese institution. Of these, 8 papers had at least one author 
from Microsoft Research Asia3.  
 
This is just one example of an international computer science conference that took 
place in the mid 2000’s in China. Around this time, international computer science 
conference steering committees started to implement a more inclusive policy of a 
cycle of USA/Europe/Asia venues, acknowledging that researchers in Asia were 
significant contributors to the international research community. One of the major 
international AI conferences, the International Semantic Web Conference (ISWC), 
had its inaugural Chinese conference in Shanghai in 20104. Another, the International 
Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), held its first conference in 
Beijing, China in 2013, and its second in Macao in 20195. 
 
	
2 http://wwwconference.org/www2008/  
3 http://wwwconference.org/www2008/papers/Proceedings.html  
4 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Semantic_Web_Conference  
5 https://www.ijcai.org/past_conferences  
These conferences allowed researchers from outside China to visit the country, 
connect with peers with similar interests, and visit a country about which very little 
was published in the West. International CS and AI conferences have been held 
regularly in China from the 2010’s – Chinese Computer Science and AI research was 
becoming internationally competitive.  
 
The AI Boom 
 
While AI in the West has gone through a series of boom and bust cycles, in terms of 
funding, since its inception in the mid-1950’s, research has been continuous world-
wide in various subfields, such as  
• computer vision, which allows computers to automatically analyse static or 
moving images to identify real-world objects, such as cancerous cells or faces;  
• natural language processing, which has enabled voice-controlled applications 
on smart phones;  
• knowledge representation and reasoning, which allows computers to reason 
with human-readable rules and expert-based knowledge; 
• robotics, which uses combinations of these techniques to provide physically 
embodied interaction with users.  
 
A game changer for AI occurred in March 2016. The AlphaGo deep learning system 
beat one of the world’s best Go professionals, 18-time world champion Lee Sedol of 
South Korea, in a Go match that was followed by more than 60 million viewers in 
China alone.6 Not only did the system beat the human champion, but the Go field 
learned from a specific move that had not been seen before, leading to speculation 




6 https://www.wired.com/2016/03/sadness-beauty-watching-googles-ai-play-go/  
7 https://www.wired.com/2016/03/two-moves-alphago-lee-sedol-redefined-future/  
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The most significant outcome of this event and the film that documented it,8 is that 
the world became aware of the power of “AI”. While the term AI has been well 
known in the academic world for many decades, its usage in mainstream media has 
come to mean a specific branch of AI, known as machine learning. The term is most 
often used for techniques based around neural network technology (see Box 1). 
 
The emergence of cheap graphics hardware (graphics processing units, GPU’s) 
designed for the commercial gaming world led to much cheaper and hence more 
exploration of machine learning techniques. It soon became clear to businesses and 
governments that this technology would have economic and societal implications of 
similar proportion to the Industrial Revolution or the development of the Internet and 
the World Wide Web. 
 
Just over a year after the AlphaGo victory, China was among the first, of now many, 
nations to develop an AI strategy9, detailing its intentions for education, research, and 
most importantly, the implications for Chinese society. China has announced 
ambitions to become a world leader in AI by 2030 (see CISTP 2018), elevating the 
phrase “made in China” to a data-driven, hi-tech ecosystem for manufacturing goods 
and technology. Europe starting developing national and European strategies around 
2018, for example establishing the European-wide High-Level Expert Group on 
	
8 https://www.alphagomovie.com  
9 https://medium.com/politics-ai/an-overview-of-national-ai-strategies-2a70ec6edfd  
Artificial Intelligence,10 which has produced Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI 
and corresponding Policy and Investment Recommendations towards sustainability, 
growth, competitiveness, and inclusion (see Craglia et al. 2018) and later publishing a 
Coordinated Plan on Artificial Intelligence.11 
 
China develops its AI strategy 
 
Since 2017, a number of nations have developed their own AI strategies. China was 
among the first to declare its intentions in its report “China AI Development Report 
2018” (see CISTP 2018). This was developed in conjunction with partners 
representing both academic and commercial interests in the country, overseen by the 
China Institute for Science and Technology Policy at Tsinghua University. 
 
The report provided a comprehensive overview of the development of AI in China, 
considering existing regional, national, and foreign AI policy documents. Among its 
goals are to increase public awareness, promote the development of AI industry (to 
retail, agriculture, logistics, finance and reshaping production for example) and act as 
a reference for policy makers. Societal goals for the use of AI are helping with an 
ageing population, supporting sustainable development and helping the country 
transform economically – towards a China which is a hi-tech developer and supplier, 
rather than consumer. 
 
	
10 https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/high-level-expert-group-artificial-intelligence  
11 https://ec.europa.eu/knowledge4policy/publication/coordinated-plan-artificial-intelligence-com2018-795-
final_en  
Three areas of AI where Chinese companies tend to specialize are voice recognition, 
computer vision, and natural language processing. This is also supported by the 
research publication analysis in the Elsevier AI report which shows that of Chinese AI 
publications in 2017, around 40% were in computer vision (Elsevier 2018, 42). These 
fields cause concern among European politicians and citizens because of their 
potential application to monitoring segments of the Chinese population that are 
deemed a security threat. 
 
The CISTP report also observes that the priorities of the USA are economic growth, 
technological development, and national security (see CISTP 2018, 5), whereas the 
concerns of Europe are the ethical risks caused by AI in fields such as security, 
privacy, and human dignity (see CISTP 2018, 5). These different regional policies 
seem aligned with underlying cultural differences among the regions. 
 
The report is realistic about the Chinese context, stating “Even recognized domestic 
AI giants such as Baidu, Alibaba and Tencent (BAT) don’t have an impressive 
performance in AI talent, papers and patents, while their U.S. competitors like IBM, 
Microsoft and Google lead AI companies worldwide in all indicators.” (see CISTP 
2018, 6) 
 
The executive summary concludes with “Currently, China’s AI policy has emphasized 
on promoting AI technological development and industrial applications and hasn’t 
given due attention to such issues as ethics and security regulation.” (CISTP 2018, 7) 
What do the numbers say? 
 
The Elsevier AI report (see Elsevier 2018) provides an analysis of publications in AI 
in China, Europe, and the USA between 1998-2017. The report’s authors used 
machine-learning techniques to identify sub-fields of AI based on a comprehensive 
set of publications from both well-known and lesser known journals and conferences. 
The report shows the clear and rapid increase of China’s influence in the field. 
For example, between 1998 and 2002, Chinese publications constituted 9% of the 
global total; EU 35%, USA 25% (see Figure 2). By around 2015, this had increased to 










Global output for AI in 1998 was around 20,000 publications (see Figure 3). (For 
those of arithmetic prowess, this gives us around 2,000 for China, 7,000 for the EU, 
and 5,000 for the USA.) 
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The rise of China
As shown in Figure 3.4, Europe is still the largest contributor to AI 
research but continues to lose publication share. The United States 
is regaining ground lost in the last five years. China is bound to 
overtake Europe in publication output in AI in the near future, 
having already overtaken the United States in 2004. 
Figure 3.5 illustrates that other individual countries are showing 
strong development in AI. For instance, India emerges as the third 
largest country in AI research in the last five years. Other emerging 
countries, like Iran, appear among the top 10 countries in AI 
research. Established research nations like Japan are also growing 
in terms of AI publication output, but with less vigour than the 
United States or China. Full country-level data is available through 
the Elsevier AI Resource Center.68
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figure 3.5  
Publication output per country/territory (all document types), 
2013-2017; source: Scopus.
figure 3.4  
Share of global publication output in AI (all document types) 
for periods 1998-2002, 2003-2007, 2008-2012, and 2013-2017, 
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68  Elsevier. Artificial Intelligence Resource Center.  
https://www.elsevier.com/connect/ai-resource-center
 
In 2013-2017, Chinese publications constituted 24% of the global total; the EU 30%, 
and the USA 17%.  The total global publication output for AI in 2017 was around 
120,000 publications – a factor 6 increase in 19 years (see Figure 3). This gives 
around 30,000 for China, 35,000 for the EU, and 20,000 for the USA. The growth in 
China alone is almost a factor of 16. 
 
These numbers show a similar trend to the numbers reported in (CISTP 2018), 
although the absolute numbers reported are different. Figure 4 indicates around 1,400 
Chinese AI publications in 1998, about 4% of the global total of 30,000, and in 2017 
nearly 40,000 publications, 28% of the global total. This represents a 30-fold increase 










The top contributors in the three regions differ in terms of industrial contributions. 
The top Chinese contributor, the Chinese Academy of Sciences, is an unfair 
comparison, since it consists of more than 100 research institutes in different fields. 
The other most prolific Chinese contributors are all academic institutions. This is 
similar to the situation in Europe, but differs from the USA, which has two companies 











The field-weighted citation impact of the publications, shown to the right of Figure 5, 
indicates that publications from the USA (authors working at these institutions) are 
much more highly cited than either their European or Chinese counterparts. Whether 
this is because the USA publications are of higher quality, published in more highly 



























































Chinese AI papers as a percentage of the global totalChinese AI papers Global AI papers
for 42.49% of all AI papers. Based on the above 
analysis, this report selected the AI-related 
proceeding papers, articles, reviews and book 
chapters published between 1997 and 2017 as the 
main basis for analysis 2. 
In the past two decades, China (including Hong 
Kong and Macao) has made giant strides in AI 
scientific paper output, with papers published in 
the field increasing from more than 1,000 in 1997 
to greater than 37,000 in 2017, and the percentage 
of the global total increasing from 4.26% in 1997 to 
27.68% in 2017 (Figure 2-2).
As shown in the figure above, China’s AI scientific 
papers experienced a certain decline in around 2007 
and 2010 in terms of both quantity and percentage 
of the global total. China’s output of articles 
and reviews has maintained an overall upward 
trend over the last 20 years, except a decline in 
2007; in contrast, China’s output of proceeding 
papers experienced remarkable fluctuations in a 
trajectory which was consistently upward before 
2006 and began zigzagging afterwards, especially 
in 2010 when it dropped by nearly 50% from 
the previous year. The significant percentage of 
proceeding papers in all AI papers provides a partial 
explanation of the significant slide of paper output 
in 2010 in Figure 2-2. ( Figure 2-3)
2  Note: Proceeding papers and book chapters that were published in SCIE journals are also marked as articles and therefore 
correspond to two document types. As a result, the sum in the above figure is more than 100%.
｜ 14｜
AI S&T Output and Talent02
cited venues, or whether AI researchers suffer from biased citation practices as a 










It is clear from these analyses that China is increasing its internationally published AI 
research output. The influence of this output, however, tends to be national rather than 
global (Elsevier 2018, 11). 
Where do we go from here? 
The political climate in the USA under the Trump administration, since early 2017, is 
not supportive of cooperation with China, to say the least. This reduction in “elan” is 
leading to closer cooperation between China and Europe (see Introductory chapter), 
with Chinese AI companies becoming keener to work more closely with European 
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figure 3.17 
To  5 institutional contributors per region by number of AI 
publications (all document types), 2013-2017; source: SciVal.
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researchers. Given the relatively small amount of research funding in European 
countries and from the European Union, the welcome addition of funds from abroad 
would seem like a golden opportunity. But things are not always as easy as they may 
appear. Firstly – do European AI researchers want to work with Chinese colleagues? 
Secondly – do European academic institutions want to be funded by Chinese 
companies? 
 
Working with AI colleagues from China 
 
There are two problems when European (top) researchers consider working with 
Chinese colleagues. The first is the perceived quality of their new colleagues. While 
the figures clearly demonstrate that the Chinese are becoming more prolific in the 
number of publications, the opinion of the quality of these by senior European 
researchers is often based on their experience as young and upcoming researchers 20+ 
years ago: Chinese research was often perceived as being good at replicating known 
techniques in new contexts, or good at taking a known technique and improving it by 
a measurable, but small, amount. This also provides a convenient explanation of why 
the work of authors based in China is less well cited. 
 
Just as with the price of shares, or indeed with any ill-chosen application of machine 
learning, the trends of the past are not able to predict the future. What cannot – yet – 
be seen in historical data is the influence of the significant increase in the return to 
China of an established generation of influential researchers who developed their 
careers abroad (see Introductory chapter). Similarly, the influence of current 
opportunities for younger Chinese researchers trained in Europe or the USA to 
establish their careers in China cannot yet be measured (see Introductory chapter). 
Both generations of researchers bring with them the competitive, individualistic risk-
driven culture learned abroad. Just as in winning in top sport – be it gymnastics, 
football, or table tennis – two things are essential: individuals with intrinsic potential 
and motivation, and an environment that polishes and hones the required 
internationally competitive skills. A characteristic of the successful Western research 
culture is questioning received wisdom, which goes against the grain of Chinese and 
many other Asian cultures. 
 
Based solely on the number of inhabitants, the number of potentially excellent AI 
researchers in China is simply larger. Having received research training in top schools 
outside China and given the ability of the Chinese educational system to rapidly 
adapt, the up and coming generation of young Chinese AI researchers will be 
internationally competitive. Now is the time for AI researchers across the globe to 
become familiar with each other’s cultures – for the benefit of the research 
community as a whole. 
 
The second problem is: who is using the research? Here, fields such as facial 
recognition and natural language processing are examples of the most problematic 
because this is the technology the West perceives the Chinese state would use to 
control specific minority groups. While science is often perceived as free of political 
considerations, the crux of the problem is discussed in this volume as the European 
perception of the role of the Chinese state (see Introductory chapter, chapter by Van 
der Wende, and Marginson & Yang). 
 
Consequently, European AI researchers do not want to work with Chinese colleagues 
on topics that are likely to aid the Chinese state in actions that do not conform to 
European civil rights & values. That there is a cultural difference in the desirability 
ascribed to the trade-offs between privacy and security for those living in China and 
Europe, discussed at the end of the chapter by Van der Wende, is hard to understand 
in and of itself and even harder when Europeans are not familiar with the Chinese 
culture. AI researchers are not the most knowledgeable of global cultural differences, 
nor do many European researchers spend extended periods of time in China to learn 
first-hand. 
 
European academic institutions accepting AI research funding from Chinese 
companies 
 
From the perspective of individual AI researchers, there is insufficient national and 
European funding to make an academic career attractive to prospective PhD students 
or indeed more established researchers. The attraction of substantially larger salaries 
and the relatively interesting work available at large companies such as Amazon, 
Facebook, Google/Alphabet, and Microsoft, together with rapidly increasing student 
numbers in AI, means that funding research projects from external sources, such as 
Chinese companies, is attractive to European academics. 
 
Understanding the motivations of AI researchers is one part of the equation, the other 
is their employers. European universities and research institutions have different 
priorities and, while research funding for one of their top AI researchers is a “nice to 
have”, it doesn’t add a large percentage to the total annual budget.  A much larger 
impact would be felt when the press “finds out” that the organisation has received 
funding from a company directly connected to the Chinese state. The role of 
universities, embedded in law, is that they can carry out research independent of any 
political influence. To what extent, thus, should unsubstantiated claims about Chinese 
companies willing to fund European AI research be subject to scrutiny by anyone 
other than the researchers themselves?  Which mechanisms12 and codes13 should 
researchers be aware of beyond their own codes of conduct for research integrity? AI 
researchers need access to reliable information sources that allow them to seek advice 
on the context and potential partners for the research they wish to conduct14. In China, 
as much as anywhere else, universities should be able to carry out research 
independently. Academic freedom can conflict with national security, so researchers 
“can’t be naïve” either. Various governments are developing guidelines for 
universities. 
 
Transferability of AI and Computer Science Results 
 
In AI, and indeed in computer science, applying results from one domain to another is 
relatively easy. No large physical infrastructure needs to be created, and with 
commercial cloud services everyone has access to as much computing power as they 
	
12 For instance; the European Commission recently raised screening for foreign direct investment, see,  
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_19_2088 
13 European Commission also developed an AI ethics code: “Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy Artificial 
Intelligence”, see,  https://ec.europa.eu/futurium/en/ai-alliance-consultation/guidelines#Top 
14 Especially in case of potential “dual-use technology”, defence related research, or researchers and universities 
with a relationship to the PLA  (Chinese army). For instance such as the recently developed “China defense 
university tracker”, see,  https://unitracker.aspi.org.au/topics/ 
can afford. In the field of computer vision, for example, techniques exist that help 
radiologists identify cancerous cells more reliably and faster than without digital aids. 
These same techniques can be applied to other domains, such as identifying facial 
features, which in turn can be used to distinguish the ethnic origin of citizens15. The 
former is, from a European perspective, desirable, the latter not. 
 
The implication is that even if European researchers do not collaborate directly with 
Chinese colleagues, the free availability of publications – an integral part of the 
European science policy – and the desire for reproducibility, means that taking 
existing programming code and repurposing it is easy for anyone knowledgeable in 
the field. The tradition of science is to share knowledge and to remain independent of 
political considerations (see Van der Wende). The field of AI can perhaps learn from 
the cyber-security field, where it is deemed important to share system vulnerability 
information internationally. Wide publication is delayed according to an agreed-upon 
protocol to allow those directly affected to take counter measures.16 The assumption is 
that “non-desirable” parties will have access to this information anyway, and 








As stated by the EU with respect to their partnership with China, the regions are 
economic competitors (see Introductory chapter). This applies both to the attraction of 
AI talent and to commercial competition. 
The global AI talent pool 
 
AI application areas include many that affect societal well-being in substantial ways, 
such as energy, health and transport. For society to enjoy the benefits of these 
technologies, we need highly educated AI practitioners to put them into practice. 
There is a global shortage of AI (including machine learning and data analytics) talent 
to take on these challenges. All parts of the globe are looking to educate their own 
talent and to attract excellent talent from abroad. This requires investment in a 
number of ways. Increasing the number of academic staff able to teach these topics, 
and increasing the efficiency of teaching. At the academic level, tenure positions are 
attractive because of the opportunity to carry out research. This requires extended 
research funding, requiring either a larger slice of the available national (or European) 
funding or attracting more funding from industries. Industries across the globe are 
acutely aware of their shortage of talent, and are willing to invest in academic 
research funding to maintain an active base of researchers and teachers in academia. 
Excellent researchers attract excellent young talent and, given the English-language 
foundation of the AI and the computer science fields, the same talent can be attracted 
to China, Europe, or the USA.  
 
There are, however, differences in the willingness of students to leave their continent 
to seek their fortune. It is likely that Chinese AI & computer science students will 
study for some time abroad before returning to China where research resources are 
currently plentiful. On the other hand, the attraction of the European work-life 
balance may play a factor. European students are much less familiar with Chinese 
cultures and language than Chinese students are with the English language, and 
American and European cultures. This creates a larger barrier to move to a region 
where the currently perceived academic benefits are low. This is independent of the 
political information about China published in Western media. This may change as 
awareness of the technological speed of change and available research resources in 
China increases, creating a stronger pull for both European and American students. 
The American dream? 
 
The field of computer science has created a number of corporate giants who dominate 
the international landscape. Names such as Amazon, Apple, Facebook, 
Google/Alphabet, Microsoft, and Netflix have created their wealth because what they 
sell can be transported across the planet at next to zero cost. These giants come from 
the start-up world in the USA and are seen as shining examples to which all 
entrepreneurs aspire. The Chinese market has seen the emergence of Alibaba, Baidu, 
and Tencent, originally with few international markets but this is changing rapidly.  
 
These are the current giants, but what of the new entrepreneurs, particularly those 
creating the AI apps of the future? Just as the USA has always been successful at 
turning (research) ideas into successful products and services, China is a more than 
competitive partner for both the USA and Europe. Kai-Fu Lee explains in (Lee 2018) 
how the “rules of engagement” of Silicon Valley start-ups have been rewritten in the 
cut-throat start-up cultures such as those in Zhongguancun,17 Beijing, and Shenzhen18 
in the Guangdong province. As he states in an interview in December 2018 “Europe 
isn’t even in the running for bronze AI medal.”19 
 
China is still criticized for the “uneven playing field” and technology transfer from 
foreign sources, thus undermining WTO rules regarding market access and IPR, 
blaming it for ‘innovation mercantilism’ (see chapter by van der Wende). 
China may be viewed as acting unfairly in this global competition. The state is 
providing a large amount of support for companies through favourable economic and 
regulatory conditions, acting “as strategic investor, consumer of digital technologies, 
and provider of access to key data” (Craglia et al. 2019, 45) Whether competition in 
AI innovation ecosystem is fair, or not, the Chinese are accelerating ahead. 
Collaboration 
 
In addition to being an economic competitor, the EU and China have closely aligned 
objectives, particularly in areas such as climate change and the health and well-being 
of their citizens (see Van der Wende). The implications for research and development 
in AI reflect aspects of both competition and collaboration. In order to catch up with 
the competition, the EU is investing 1.5 billion euros in AI for the period 2018-2020, 
aiming to develop a European approach to AI, while ensuring an appropriate ethical 
	
17 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zhongguancun  
18 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shenzhen  
19 https://sifted.eu/articles/interview-google-kaifu-lee-ai-artificial-intelligence/  
and legal framework in line with (among others) The General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR)20 (see chapter by van Deursen and Kummeling).  
Selecting applications of mutual benefit, such as health, energy, and transport would 
be areas where collaboration from research through to innovation could be stimulated. 
In addition, many in China also share the “European” interest in ethics21. 
 
The European Commission established a European wide High-Level Expert Group on 
Artificial Intelligence22 in 2018 to provide advice on ethical, legal, and societal issues 
occurring as a result of implementing their AI policies. About half the group have 
technical expertise in some field of AI, with other experts from areas such as law, 
philosophy, and labor/workforce. While AI has a history of interdisciplinary 
collaboration with other fields, such as cognitive science or philosophy, AI 
researchers are not specifically trained in communication about their field to other 
disciplines – let alone politicians. The rapid uptake of and interest in the field has 
meant that many AI researchers are taking on a broader role in their – already busy – 
schedules, becoming consultants to other fields to explain the technologies in a way 
that others can understand and, perhaps more importantly, understand the limitations 
of what AI is capable of; not just at this moment but the fundamental limitations of 
the current approaches. The report published jointly by Informatics Europe and the 
ACM Europe Council – influential bodies in the field of AI and computer science in 






22 https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/high-level-expert-group-artificial-intelligence  
Automated Decision Making” is an example of this (Larus et al. 2018). Joint 




The balance in the world of AI research has changed unrecognisably in the past 20 
years. A new equilibrium is being established as China directs huge resources into 
educating talent that will contribute to international research and national innovation. 
China has already caught up with Europe and the USA, and is accelerating ahead. 
Europe has centuries-old excellent higher education systems but needs to scale up 
capacity to produce its own AI research and development talent pool. While this is 
likely to succeed, the entrepreneurial “gap” between Europe and the USA still exists 
and China is likely to surpass the achievements of both. Where China needs to devote 
effort is in the stimulation of creativity and critiquing methods to further develop their 
own talent. 
 
In the grand scheme of things, Europe and China have the same goals for AI research 
and development – to provide personal wealth and public services to their citizens. 
Devoting resources to energy, health, and transport is for the benefit of all. While 
China is attractive to young hi-tech talent, working weeks are long and there is little 
opportunity to spend time with family and friends. In Europe, it is not just one’s 
standard of living that is important but also one’s quality of life. Development of AI 
technologies provides hope that both can be achieved through more efficient use of 
the limited resources available.  
 
The AI research community is a global one, and Chinese and European students and 
graduates have always been drawn to the USA. Encouraging European researchers to 
spend longer periods of time visiting colleagues in China would accelerate the field’s 
progress. Exchange programs could be set up to stimulate collaboration; minors in 
Mandarin could be offered within AI programs. 
 
AI is a generic technology that can be applied to a variety of application domains such 
as security, facial recognition, and natural language understanding. Deciding when to, 
and when not to, collaborate poses a difficult choice for which AI researchers are 
neither trained nor sufficiently informed.  Both Chinese and European AI researchers 
need guidance from their politicians and security agencies to inform decisions on 
whether or not they should collaborate with international colleagues or companies. 
This should not limit their independence to choose which research to carry out, but 
give access to information relevant to an informed decision. Politicians, on the other 
hand, should not be overly influenced by wavering public opinion, or short-term 
economic benefit, but should rather consider longer-term perspectives in international 
relations. 
 
AI research and innovation is already taking place along the New Silk Road. Europe 
and China can benefit from each other’s perspectives – something that our AI systems 
are not yet able to do for us. 
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